本文借鑑了國際政治經濟學的研究方法，從政治和經濟兩方面研究了外商直接投資對開發中國家利益的影響。本文首先回顧了中外學者對國家利益的研究，在此基礎上界定了本文研究的國家利益包括政治利益和經濟利益兩個方面。接下來，依次考察了外商直接投資的現狀、主要的外商直接投資理論和關於外商直接投資與開發中國家利益的理論和實證研究，並對相關理論和實證研究進行了評述。
基本介紹
- 中文名：外商直接投資與開發中國家利益的國際政治經濟學分析
- 借鑑：國際政治經濟學的研究方法
- 主體部分：已開發國家、跨國公司和開發中國家
- 影響：對開發中國家利益產生影響
- 作者：周學森
- 指導教師：李慧中
中文摘要,外文摘要,
中文摘要
本文借鑑了國際政治經濟學的研究方法，從政治和經濟兩方面研究了外商直接投資對開發中國家利益的影響。本文首先回顧了中外學者對國家利益的研究，在此基礎上界定了本文研究的國家利益包括政治利益和經濟利益兩個方面。接下來，依次考察了外商直接投資的現狀、主要的外商直接投資理論和關於外商直接投資與開發中國家利益的理論和實證研究，並對相關理論和實證研究進行了評述。
在本文的主體部分，作者把與外商直接投資相關的利益主體分為三個：已開發國家、跨國公司和開發中國家，它們的投資(引資)行為都會對開發中國家利益產生影響。在詳細考察了各利益主體在投資(引資)中的...>> 詳細 在詳細考察了各利益主體在投資(引資)中的策略選擇和收益函式的基礎之上，本文構建了一個政治經濟博弈模型，從合作與衝突的角度分別考察了三個層次的博弈：已開發國家——開發中國家，跨國公司——開發中國家，開發中國家——開發中國家。
在本文的主體部分，作者把與外商直接投資相關的利益主體分為三個：已開發國家、跨國公司和開發中國家，它們的投資(引資)行為都會對開發中國家利益產生影響。在詳細考察了各利益主體在投資(引資)中的...>> 詳細 在詳細考察了各利益主體在投資(引資)中的策略選擇和收益函式的基礎之上，本文構建了一個政治經濟博弈模型，從合作與衝突的角度分別考察了三個層次的博弈：已開發國家——開發中國家，跨國公司——開發中國家，開發中國家——開發中國家。
在考察已開發國家與開發中國家的博弈時，除分析了已開發國家和開發中國家博弈的基本模型之外，還分析了已開發國家主導下的國際制度安排和已開發國家的對外投資政策對開發中國家利益的影響。在考察跨國公司與開發中國家的博弈時，除了分析了跨國公司與開發中國家博弈的基本模型之外，還分析了跨國公司的討價還價能力、投資質量、投資類型、政治行為以及投資爭端解決等對開發中國家利益的影響。在考察開發中國家之間的引資博弈時，分析了開發中國家的政治、經濟合作與競爭對開發中國家利益的影響。
最後，本文採用了世界銀行和中國國家統計局的最新數據，實證檢驗了FDI與開發中國家整體、FDI與中國經濟成長之間的關係。
關鍵字：外商直接投資 開發中國家利益 國際政治經濟學
關鍵字：外商直接投資 開發中國家利益 國際政治經濟學
外文摘要
In this article, we adopt the perspective of International Political Economics to analyze the political and economic effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the national interest of developing countries.
First, we review the study of national interest and specify the definition we use in this article, which includes both economic and political interest. Second, we examine FDI worldwide, chief theories of FDI and empirical research concerning how FDI affects the interest of developi...>> 詳細
First, we review the study of national interest and specify the definition we use in this article, which includes both economic and political interest. Second, we examine FDI worldwide, chief theories of FDI and empirical research concerning how FDI affects the interest of developi...>> 詳細
In this article, we adopt the perspective of International Political Economics to analyze the political and economic effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the national interest of developing countries.
First, we review the study of national interest and specify the definition we use in this article, which includes both economic and political interest. Second, we examine FDI worldwide, chief theories of FDI and empirical research concerning how FDI affects the interest of developing countries.
In the main body of this article we will establish a game model with three players: the developed country, the multi-national company and the developing country. Two of the three players are included in the game model each time, with the developing country as the constant. We examine the strategies of each player and define their income functions, with economic and political interest included.
In the following three chapters, we analyze the game between the developed country and the developing country, between the multi-national company and the developing country and between two developing countries separately. When analyzing the game between the developed country and the developing country, we examine how the international institutions and the foreign policy of the former affect the latter''s national interest when attracting FDI. When analyzing the game between the multi-national company and the developing country, we examine how the former''s bargaining power, investment qualities, investment types and political behaviors affect the latter''s national interest. When analyzing the game between two developing countries, we examine how their cooperative and competitive behaviors concerning FDI affect each country''s national interest.
In the last section we will empirically examine whether FDI leads to the economic development of developing countries.
Key Words: Foreign Direct Investment, National Interest of Developing Countries, International Political Economics
First, we review the study of national interest and specify the definition we use in this article, which includes both economic and political interest. Second, we examine FDI worldwide, chief theories of FDI and empirical research concerning how FDI affects the interest of developing countries.
In the main body of this article we will establish a game model with three players: the developed country, the multi-national company and the developing country. Two of the three players are included in the game model each time, with the developing country as the constant. We examine the strategies of each player and define their income functions, with economic and political interest included.
In the following three chapters, we analyze the game between the developed country and the developing country, between the multi-national company and the developing country and between two developing countries separately. When analyzing the game between the developed country and the developing country, we examine how the international institutions and the foreign policy of the former affect the latter''s national interest when attracting FDI. When analyzing the game between the multi-national company and the developing country, we examine how the former''s bargaining power, investment qualities, investment types and political behaviors affect the latter''s national interest. When analyzing the game between two developing countries, we examine how their cooperative and competitive behaviors concerning FDI affect each country''s national interest.
In the last section we will empirically examine whether FDI leads to the economic development of developing countries.
Key Words: Foreign Direct Investment, National Interest of Developing Countries, International Political Economics
