洪昀(湖南大學工商管理學院助理教授)

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洪昀,男,博士,湖南大學工商管理學院助理教授,碩士研究生導師。

基本介紹

  • 中文名:洪昀
  • 畢業院校:上海財經大學
  • 學位/學歷:博士
  • 專業方向:管理科學與工程
  • 任職院校:湖南大學
人物經歷,教育經歷,工作經歷,研究領域,講授課程,學術成果,

人物經歷

教育經歷

2014.09- 湖南大學 管理科學與工程 博士後
2009.09-2013.06 上海財經大學 會計學博士
2007.09-2009.07 湖南大學 會計學碩士
2003.09-2007.07 湖南大學 會計學學士

工作經歷

2013.06~2014.05工商銀行上海分行 項目經理
2014.05~至今湖南大學工商管理學院助理教授

研究領域

1.會計與審計研究
2.經濟制度與公司治理
3.金融工程

講授課程

本科:高級財務會計學,國際會計
MBA & 碩士:會計理論

學術成果

[1] Xue Shuang,Hong Yun,Earnings management, corporate governance and expense stickiness.China Journal of Accounting Research, China Journal of Accounting Research, 2015,41(1):41-58
摘要:Cost and expense stickiness is an important issue in accounting and economics research, and the literature has shown that cost stickiness cannot be separated from managers’ motivations. In this paper, we examine the effects that earnings management has on expense stickiness. Defining small positive profits or small earnings increases as earnings management, we observe significant expense stickiness in the non-earnings-management sub-sample, compared with the earnings-management sub-sample. When we divide expenses into R&D, advertising and other general expenses, we find that managers control expenses mainly by decreasing general expenses. We further examine corporate governance’s effect on expense stickiness. Using factor analysis, we extract eight main factors and find that good corporate governance reduces expense stickiness. Finally, we investigate the interaction effects of earnings management and corporate governance on expense stickiness. The empirical results show that good corporate governance can further reduce cost stickiness, although its effect is not as strong as that of earnings management。
[2] Pu Danlin ,Hong, Yun ; Hsueh, Ming-Hsien. Chief Financial Officers’ Power, Institutional Environment, and Corporate Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from China .Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2015, 51(1):196-213
摘要:In this study, we investigate how chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) power and institutional environment influence corporate effective tax rates (ETRs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2010, we find that firms with expert power or political power CFOs enjoy a low effective tax rate. Furthermore, CFOs’ expert power plays a more important function in reducing ETR in regions with a better institutional environment compared to those with less-developed institutions. CFOs’ political power is the most important factor in reducing ETR in regions with a less developed institutional environment than in those regions with a better institutional environment。
[3]JunHuang,ShuangXue,andYunHong,VerticalIntegrationandInventoryManagementEfficiency.ChinaAccountingandFinanceReview, 2016,16(4): 1-48.
摘要:This paper investigates the role of vertical integration in the inventory management of a supply chain. Taking Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2010 as our sample, we find that vertically integrated firms have lower inventory holdings and volatility, indicating that vertical integration improves firms' inventory management efficiency. Further analyses show that this effect is more pronounced for firms located in regions with a lower level of marketisation and for firms facing higher demand volatility and business growth. In addition, the more thoroughly firms have accomplished vertical integration, the more greatly vertical integration increases inventory management efficiency. Finally, we find that the positive impact of vertical integration on inventory management is more significant in industries with no overcapacity, for diversified firms, and during non-crisis periods.
[4] Shuang Xue; Ye, Feiteng ; Yun Hong. Partner–client relationship and auditor switches. 2013, 1(2):114-137
摘要:This study investigates the effect of a partner–client relationship on auditor switches. We find that a non-signing partner, especially one who is ‘job-hopping,’ has a significant effect on auditor switches. Specifically, if a partner who was the signatory of a public company’s annual report no longer signs for the accounting firm or leaves the firm, the public company that he or she signed for tends to change its auditor as well. When the job-hopping partner jumps to a new accounting firm with a certificate to service public companies, the probability of an auditor switch is the highest. The former auditee (or ‘client’ hereafter) can follow the partner to the new accounting firm to retain the special partner–client relationship. Furthermore, we consider that there are usually two signing partners with different tenures for a client’s annual report. Empirical results show that the non-signing partner can more significantly affect a client’s auditor switch when he or she is the one with the comparatively longer tenure. These results imply that the partner–client relationship is valuable to accounting firms and will help with client retention.
[5] 薛爽; 洪昀; 陳昕. 股權性質、政治關係與地方政府拉閘限電——來自有色金屬行業的經驗證據.金融研究。2013年第3期
摘要:2010年是我國實現"十一五"所規劃的萬元GDP能耗下降20%目標的收官之年,各地方由於完不成節能減排任務,紛紛對企業進行"拉閘限電"。我們以河北、山西、河南、內蒙古四省的有色金屬行業為樣本,研究了所有權性質、民營企業政治關係對地方政府拉閘限電行為的影響,並對比分析了不同企業被限電的經濟後果。結果表明,地方政府官員在一票否決的強激勵考核評價機制下,對高耗能的有色金屬行業實行了普遍的限電措施。國有企業被拉閘限電時間要顯著少於民營企業,說明存在事實上的所有制歧視。具有政治關係的民營企業比不具有政治關係的民營企業被拉閘限電的機率更低,時間更短。民營企業相對於國有企業、無政治關係的民營企業相對於有政治關係的民營企業在拉閘限電後,銷售收入和總(淨)資產利潤率下降幅度更大。
[6]薛爽; 葉飛騰;洪昀. 會計師-客戶關係與事務所變更.會計研究。2013年第9期
摘要:本文研究會計師-客戶關係如何影響客戶對事務所的選擇。研究發現,如果負責某家上市公司年報審計業務的簽字會計師不再為原事務所簽字或離開原事務所,那么由該會計師負責簽字的上市公司更換事務所的可能性顯著提高。尤其是當簽字會計師跳槽到另一家具有證劵審計資格的事務所時,客戶變更事務所的可能性更高。進一步地,當兩位簽字會計師任期不同時,如任期較長的簽字會計師不再為該客戶簽字,客戶換所的可能性更高。這些結果表明,緊密的會計師-客戶關係能夠幫助事務所留住客戶,對事務所而言具有重要價值。
[7] 薛爽; 都衛鋒; 洪昀. CFO影響力與企業稅負水平——基於企業所有權視角的分析.財經研究.2012年第10期
摘要:文章基於企業所有權性質的視角,研究了CFO的影響力與公司稅負水平之間的關係。文章將CFO影響力分為組織影響力、專業影響力、聲譽影響力和所有權影響力。實證結果表明,較強的CFO影響力與企業實際稅負水平負相關。進一步研究發現,在不同性質的企業中,CFO影響力與稅負水平之間的負相關關係不同。在民營企業中,CFO在四個維度上的影響力均與稅負水平顯著負相關;在國有企業中,只有CFO所有權影響力與企業稅負水平負相關。CFO影響力對企業實際稅負水平的影響主要存在於民營企業,說明CFO職能定位在國有企業和民營企業中存在差異。

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