陳婧，女，2004年從清華大學計算機科學與技術專業本科畢業，2007年獲得該校工學碩士學位。清華大學計算機系教授，國家海外高層次人才計畫獲得者。
2012年，在圖靈獎得主西爾維奧·米卡利的指導下，陳婧在麻省理工學院完成博士學業。曾任知名區塊鏈技術公司阿爾戈蘭德（Algorand）首席科學家兼理論研究主管，紐約州立大學石溪分校計算機系助理教授。2016年獲美國國家科學基金會職業成就獎。在計算理論和經濟學的頂會、頂刊發表多篇論文，多次擔任計算理論、計算博弈論、安全、區塊鏈等領域重要國際會議PC。2024年1月8日下午，清華大學長聘教授聘任儀式上，校長李路明為陳婧頒發了長聘教授聘書。
主要研究方向為區塊鏈、智慧型契約、計算博弈論和機制設計。
基本介紹
- 中文名：陳婧
- 畢業院校：清華大學
- 學位/學歷：博士
人物經歷,研究方向,主要成就,獲獎記錄,社會任職,
人物經歷
2004年，獲得清華大學計算機科學與技術專業本科學位。
2007年，獲得清華大學計算機科學與技術專業碩士學位。
2012年，獲得麻省理工學院計算機科學專業博士學位。
2024年1月8日下午，清華大學長聘教授聘任儀式上，校長李路明為陳婧頒發了長聘教授聘書。
研究方向
計算理論、算法博弈論、機制設計、區塊鏈和分散式賬本
我的研究工作的一個重要主題是多實體之間的互動，這一主題貫穿了我的大多數工作，從算法博弈論到分散式賬本。與運行單機算法的獨立的計算機系統不同，今天的大規模計算機系統和網路經常有很多參與者在分散式的環境中進行互動，電子商務、社交網路、多智慧型體系統、區塊鏈等等都是如此。這些系統的參與者可能是人也可能是人工智慧，可能是個體也可能是大型公司、機構，不同的參與者在同一個系統中的目的也各不相同。我的研究工作旨在設計這樣的系統，用嚴格的理論來刻畫參與者的行為，並特別關注其中的計算效率、經濟效率、健壯性等等問題，使得系統不僅能高效地運行，而且能夠在不理想、不友好的環境中仍然保持安全和健壯。
主要成就
讀博期間，陳婧運用計算理論思維解決了經濟學中認知博弈論領域的重要問題，相關工作成果被寫進了認知博弈論的教材。在美國石溪大學計算機系任教期間，陳婧與團隊從第一性原理出發，設計並證明了一個全新的共識協定，推翻了“區塊鏈不可能三角”假說，受到業界的廣泛關注。
在美國石溪大學計算機系任教期間，陳婧與團隊從第一性原理出發，設計並證明了一個全新的共識協定，推翻了“區塊鏈不可能三角”假說，受到業界的廣泛關注。
1. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. J. Chen, B. Li, Y. Li, and P. Lu. Journal of Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), Vol. 303, 2022, 103630.
2. Small Profits and Quick Returns: An Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing under Continuous Platform Competition. D. Baek, J. Chen, B. J. Choi. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 349 – 362, 2020.
3. Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger. J. Chen and S. Micali. Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Vol. 777, pp. 155-183, 2019.
4. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 373–416, 2019.
5. Reinforcement Learning based Schemes to Manage Client Activities in Large Distributed Control Systems. Y. Gao, J. Chen, T. Robertazzi, and K. A. Brown. Physical Review Accelerators and Beams (PRAB), Vol. 22, Iss. 1, Article 014601, 2019.
6. Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. H. Chan, J. Chen, and G. Srinivasan. Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Vol. 5, Iss. 2, Article 12, 2017.
7. Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions. J. Chen and S. Micali. Games, Special Issue on Epistemic Game Theory and Logic, Vol. 7, Iss. 32, 2016.
8. Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare. M. Braverman, J. Chen, and S. Kannan. Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR), Vol. 41, Iss. 1, pp. 352 - 376, 2016.
9. Tight Revenue Bounds with Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality. J. Chen, S. Micali, and R. Pass. Econometrica, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1619-1639, 2015.
10. Mechanism Design with Possibilistic Beliefs. J. Chen and S. Micali. Journal of Economic Theory (JET), invited to the special issue dedicated to the interface between Economics and Computer Science, Vol. 156, pp. 77-102, 2015.
11. The Robustness of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games. J. Chen and A. Zinger. Journal of Theoretical Biology (JTB), Vol. 357, pp. 46–54, 2014.
12. The Order Independence of Iterated Dominance in Extensive Games. J. Chen and S. Micali. Theoretical Economics (TE), Vol. 8, pp. 125-163, 2013.
13. Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness. J. Chen and S. Micali. Journal of Economic Theory (JET), Vol. 147, Iss. 3, pp. 1300-1312, 2012.
14. A New Framework to the Design and Analysis of Identity-Based Identification Schemes. G. Yang, J. Chen, D. Wong, X. Deng, and D. Wang. Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Vol. 407, Iss. 1-3, pp. 370-388, 2008.
15. Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries. J. Chen and B. Li. 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp. 486-503, 2021.
16. Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs. J. Chen, S. McCauley and Shikha Singh. 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pp. 29:1-29:16, 2019.
17. Towards a Verified Model of the Algorand Consensus Protocol in Coq. M. A. Alturki, J. Chen, V. Luchangco, B. Moore, K. Palmskog, L. Peña and G. Roşu. 1st Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC), 2019.
18. Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods. H. Chan, J. Chen, B. Li and X. Wu. 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 137–143, 2019. Extended abstract appeared at AAMAS 2019.
19. Approximately Maximizing the Broker’s Profit in a Two-sided Market. J. Chen, B. Li and Y. Li. 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 151–157, 2019.
20. Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pp. 43-55, 2018.
21. Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees. J. Chen, S. McCauley, and S. Singh. 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pp. 150-162, 2018.
22. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. J. Chen, B. Li, Y. Li and P. Lu. International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 108:1-108:4, 2018.
23. A success-history based learning procedure to optimize server throughput in large distributed control systems. Y. Gao, J. Chen, T. Robertazzi, and K. A. Brown. 16th International Conference on Accelerator and Large Experimental Physics Control Systems (ICALEPCS), 2017.
24. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 11:1-11:15, 2017.
25. Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. H. Chan and J. Chen. 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 278-286, 2016.
Presented at the 26th International Conference on Game Theory, 2015.
26. Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Dealers. H. Chan and J. Chen. 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 113-122, 2016.
27. Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers. J. Chen, S. McCauley, and S. Singh. 7th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 237-248, 2016.
28. Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model. J. Chen and S. Micali. 7th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 201-211, 2016.
29. Better Outcomes from More Rationality. J. Chen, S. Micali, and R. Pass. 6th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 325-325, 2015.
30. Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets. H. Chan and J. Chen. 10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp. 89-105, 2014.
31. Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare. M. Braverman, J. Chen, and S. Kannan. 5th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 541-542, 2014.
32. Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs. J. Chen and S. Micali. 52nd Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 87-96, 2011.
33. Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions. P. Azar, J. Chen, and S. Micali. 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 236-248, 2012.
34. Robust Perfect Revenue from Perfectly Informed Players. J. Chen, A. Hassidim, and S. Micali. 1st Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 94-105, 2010.
35. Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions. J. Chen, S. Micali, and P. Valiant. 1st Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 81-93, 2010.
36. A New Approach to Auctions and Resilient Mechanism Design. J. Chen and S. Micali. 41st Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 503-512, 2009.
37. A More Natural Way to Construct Identity-Based Identification Schemes. G. Yang, J. Chen, D. Wong, X. Deng, and D. Wang. Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS), pp. 307-322, 2007.
38.Malicious KGC Attack in Certificateless Cryptography. M. H. Au, J. Chen, J. K. Liu, Y. Mu, D. Wong, and G. Yang. 2nd Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS), pp. 302-311, 2007.
獲獎記錄
2016年獲美國國家科學基金會職業成就獎。
社會任職
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC): Associate Editor, 2021-present.
